C, a solicitor and partner in a firm, applied on his own behalf and on behalf of others who had a similar interest to his own, for an injunction in representative proceedings for harassment. D1 was a disgruntled former client and D2 was the operator of the website solicitorsfromhell.co.uk (“sfh.co.uk”), against whom judgment and had been entered and final orders made in Law Society v Kordowski  EWHC 3185 (QB).
XYZ.net was the successor website to sfh.co.uk and proclaimed itself as such. There appeared on it and on other websites serious allegations of misconduct about C and others, in particular regarding their work on behalf of D2. The other websites were registered by D2 (“the Beach websites”). On 25 April 2012 the firm wrote to D2 complaining of wrongful use of its name in the domain of the Beach websites. D2 responded by email enclosing a letter from D1 to C’s firm rejecting the complaint, inviting the firm to sue for defamation and appointing D2 to act as his agent. D2 thereafter engaged in correspondence on behalf of D1.
On 28 March 2013 C’s firm sent D1 a pre-action letter complaining of the content of the Beach websites, complaining that the content was being published with D2’s assistance in breach of the Law Society injunction and in breach of copyright. Neither of the Ds replied.
On 30 July 2014 C’s solicitors sent by post and email to D1 and D2 detailed pre-action letters complaining that by publishing on XYZ.co.uk and the Beach websites, each had pursued a course of conduct amounting to harassment against C and others contrary to s.1(1) of the PHA 1997. The letters required removal of the content relating to C and others, delivery up of off-line data, undertakings not to harass, to cease publication and be bound by an injunction. A deadline of 5 August 2014 was set, but neither of the Ds replied.
C issued proceedings on 6 August 2014. D1 was sued in his personal capacity. D2 was sued in his personal capacity and in a representative capacity on behalf of all others who may be involved in the operation and publication of XYZ.net. The principal remedy sought was an injunction to restrain harassment of C and the protected parties. C issued an application notice seeking interim injunctions against both Ds at the same time.
The claim documentation and evidence was served at D1’s address on 6 August 2014, by handing it to a lady who answered the door. It was delivered at an address believed to be D2’s address on the same day. It was also served by email.
C’s injunction application came before Slade J on 13 August 2014 (QRS v Beach  EWHC 3057 (QB)). D2 had not been properly served as the address to which documents were delivered was a former residential address. D1 had been duly served. Permission was given to amend the claim form and Particulars, and injunctions were granted against both Ds.
On 15 August 2014 D2 was served personally with claim documentation and copies of orders made by Slade J. D1 was served personally on 16 August. Both Ds were provided with copies of the documents by email on 18 August. D1 made no communication with C’s solicitors by email, but further websites were created. On one of these a posting appeared which referred to the letter of claim dated 30 July 2014 and containing defiant statements about the claim together with pdfs of some of the material prepared for the 13 August hearing. D2 responded to service of proceedings with letter demanding that Slade J’s order be discharged or varied, and that the claim be set aside.
Neither D filed an acknowledgement of service. C decided to seek judgment in default and issued an application notice doing so, which included an application for a final injunction. Evidence was relied on, and served on both Ds together with the application notice by post and email. D1 made no formal response to being served but further websites were set up. D2 responded by email. On 15 September C’s solicitors wrote to and emailed D2 asking him if he intended to appear or be represented. He did not reply.
On 16 September 2014, before Stuart-Smith J, C applied for and obtained judgment in default and a permanent injunction against both Ds: QRS v Beach (No. 2)  EWHC 3319 (QB). On 17 September the final order and re-amended Particulars of Claim for which Stuart-Smith J had given permission were personally served on D2.
On 9 October 2014 D2 issued an application notice seeking to set aside the judgment and final injunction against him, attaching a copy of his letter of 18 August 2014.
C submitted that, in addition to meeting the conditions specified in CPR 13.3, which sets out the principles to be applied on an application to set aside a default judgment under Part 12, D2 had to persuade the court to revoke the final injunction granted by Stuart-Smith J.