(1) Granting judgment for the Claimant on the libel claim:
(a) B had in fact been interviewed by C by telephone on 11 December 2006. It followed that she knew she had been interviewed, unless she had subsequently forgotten about it. B’s assertions of poor memory were rejected. Her memory of the events in 2006, evidence at trial and demeanor as a witness suggested B knew that the interview allegation was untrue.
(b) In the alternative, if B’s memory was dim in relation to C’s request for an interview, Tugendhat J accepted without hesitation that B had been reckless in failing to check before making the interview allegation. Where a journalist contemplates publishing a statement of facts which is defamatory of the subject, it is a requirement of responsible journalism that the subject should be invited to comment upon that statement before it is published. B accepted she was accusing C of lying but failed to offer any convincing reasons for omitting to check if the allegation was true. Her behaviour subsequent to C’s complaint was further probative of her indifference.
(2) Concerning the alternative claim for libel in respect of the website publication:
(a) B’s claim that she did not know her reviews were published on the website was rejected. Applying the principle of responsibility for publication in Bunt v Tilley  1 WLR 1243, at , B was a publisher in the ordinary sense of the word in the law of libel, because she had knowingly permitted D’s in-house lawyers to communicate information which was defamatory. Given her malicious state of mind in relation to the interview allegation, this was all that C needed to prove in respect of the website publication. If the Judge was wrong about her initial state of mind, B was malicious after she had been put on notice of C’s complaint, and certainly after C had complained to the editor, since B had been sent a copy of that complaint. Moreover, if (contrary to the foregoing) D was correct that C needed to show that a deliberate decision had been taken in bad faith to continue publishing, C would still have succeeded. B had persuaded D’s in-house lawyers that the conversation which had taken place was not an interview and taken a deliberate decision to mislead them. If she had told the truth, the website publication would have been suspended.
(3) Granting judgment for the Claimant on the malicious falsehood claim:
(a) C’s evidence proved as a matter of fact that she did not grant her interviewees copy approval, merely an opportunity to give feedback. There was a distinction between the quotation approval practised by C and copy approval, which B well understood.
(b) On the basis of the book itself, the only material which B had before her at the time she wrote the review, B had no reason to believe and did not believe that C had given a right of copy approval to the people she had quoted. B understood that an opportunity was not a right and believed that what she had written was false.
Damages awarded to C:
(a) In assessing the award, Tugendhat J took into account the circulation of the review, both in hard copy and online, and the serious aggravating factors of B’s malice and D’s intrusive and humiliating cross-examination of C. Limited mitigation resulted from D’s apology, published about ten months after the first publication, and about six months after the review had been removed from the website.
(b) The least award of damages necessary was set at £65,000, £50,000 to the libel and £15,000 to the malicious falsehood and if necessary, apportioned 50/50 between the print and online edition.