Dismissing the application for interim relief:
1. There was a serious issue to be tried on the question of whether D was contractually entitled to terminate the Claimants’ contracts on the grounds set out in its 4 March 2014 letters.
The plain words of the contract did not cover what D had purported to do in this case. The contract set out the circumstances in which the Claimants’ engagement could be terminated (see - of the judgment), but did not include a termination provision in the event of creative decisions as to staging the play, despite the fact that it would have easy to do so. Although an authoritative interpretation of the contract could only be given at trial, the Claimants’ prospects on this aspect of the case were strong.
However, Cranston J was not persuaded that specific performance or a mandatory injunction would be granted at trial. The well-established principle that the remedy of specific performance, or an analogous injunction, should not be available to require an employer who has wrongfully dismissed employees to take them back had been restated in in Geys v Société Générale  UKSC 63. The present application was not an exceptional case; thus loss of confidence was the primary block to this type of relief.
In addition, section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that, in considering whether to grant any relief which may affect the right to freedom of expression, the court must have particular regard to the importance of that right. The section refers to artistic and related material and the Strasbourg jurisprudence was clear that Article 10 protected artistic expression. The decisions of producers and artistic teams in staging plays were protected by Article 10. Here, the effect of the order sought would be to interfere with D’s right of artistic freedom. It would prevent it from continuing with the play in the form which it judged to be artistically preferable and would involve the court dictating how the play could be produced by requiring it to incorporate a live band. That was a clear interference with the right and was neither necessary nor proportionate to the protection of the rights of the Claimants under Article 10(2). The Claimants’ own rights to freedom of expression were not in any way curbed, since they could continue to play their instruments, albeit not in War Horse.
2. The award of damages would be an adequate remedy to cover the loss sustained between the instant hearing and the trial.
There would be no difficulty in quantifying the Claimants’ loss to an expedited hearing. In any event, judges were accustomed to assessing damages in situations more complex than this.
3. The balance of convenience lied firmly against granting the interim relief sought.
Refusal was the course which was likely to involve the least risk of injustice if the decision turned out to be wrong. The relief sought would involve unwinding the production of War Horse without the band and forcing the creative team to work with musicians pending trial, despite them not believing that they contributed positively to the play. If the interim relief was not continued at trial, damages would not be an adequate remedy for D. Although the Claimants would be without their current income for the interim period, D had agreed not to take any point about their non-attendance at work regarding affirmation of the contact, so they could seek employment elsewhere.