Appeal dismissed in respect of the Grounds of appeal where PTA had been granted, and PTA was refused in respect of the remainder. Of the 6 Grounds which fell to be adjudicated at the hearing:
Ground B (Meaning)- PTA was refused- the Judge was ‘obviously’ correct in his conclusions on this point.
Ground C (Proof of justification)- PTA was refused- the Judge was wholly entitled to reject the justification defence on the merits .
Ground D (Privilege)- PTA was refused- the Ground was hopeless. There was no question of D2’s interview having been conducted by the Russian prosecutors; it was an interview by Mr Medvedev of RTR for the purpose of a TV broadcast .
Ground E (Republication)- Appeal dismissed- the inescapable conclusion based on the facts surrounding the interview was that D appreciated that the interview was going to be broadcast in the UK .
It was unnecessary for this Court to decide what the exact test for fixing liability for republication was (i.e. whether it was reasonable forseeability, or if it required a deliberate intention that the words be republished) because, on the facts, D was liable for republication whatever the test .
Ground F (Damages)- Appeal dismissed- there was no basis made out to justify an interference with the Judge’s award; whilst it was high it did not “substantially [exceed] the most that any jury could reasonably have thought appropriate” , and it therefore satisfied the dictum of Simon Brown LJ in Kiam v MGN  EWCA Civ 43.
John v MGN Ltd  QB 586 was not intended to prescribe a sharp or precise correlation with damages for personal injuries in defamation cases .
The Judge had provided sufficient reasoning to justify the damages award he made; he clearly took account of “the libel’s inherent gravity, its having gone uncorrected for about three years, the attempt to show that it was true, the distress occasioned, and the need for vindication” .
Ground G (Fresh Evidence)- the power to adduce fresh evidence was governed by CPR 52.11(2)(b), coupled with the duty to exercise it in accordance with the overriding objective .
The CA held that Mr Lugovoy’s account of events was extremely suspect , and was not sensibly capable of belief . On that basis the third Ladd v Marshall criterion was not met. Neither the interests of justice nor the overriding objective required that that evidence be admitted (in fact quite the contrary).
The CA stated that if Mr Lugovoy’s account of events were genuine the Russian prosecutors who assisted D2 to present his case before the Judge would have been armed with it before trial, and would have thrust it upon the Judge, given their substantial and direct involvement with the proceedings .