On 5 December 2025, Guy Vassall-Adams KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) dismissed a defendant’s application to set aside the judgments against him, on liability and remedies, on the ground that they had allegedly been obtained by fraud. The Judge held that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear such an application by the unsuccessful party ([2025] EWHC 3201 (KB)).
The background to the application was a successful libel claim brought by a businessman, Tamim Rashed, in 2023 in respect to five posts by the defendant on LinkedIn. Master Eastman had entered judgment for the claimant, after striking out the defendant’s defence and then later refusing him permission to amend in respect to his fourth attempt to plead a defence. At a remedies trial, Tipples J awarded Mr Rashed £85,000 in damages.
Following the commencement of enforcement proceedings in the Chancery Division, the defendant issued an application to set aside the judgment of Tipples J (and for other orders) on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. Mr Rashed strongly disputes that allegation. Deputy High Court Judge Aidan Eardley KC directed that four issues be determined at a hearing of preliminary issues, including whether the court had jurisdiction to hear such an application.
In his judgment, DHCJ Guy Vassall-Adams KC held that it did not. His judgment considers the authorities on (i) setting aside a judgment for fraud, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd [2019] UKSC 13; [2020] AC 450, in which Lord Sumption JSC explained that that right was a cause of action; (ii) where, on an appeal, the appeal court may nevertheless remit the matter back to a judge (Noble v Owens [2010] EWCA Civ 224; [2010] W.L.R. 249); and (iii) the scope of CPR 3.1(7) (which the defendant relied upon) and how that interacted with the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
In holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear such an application in the same proceedings, the Judge held that the starting point was the principle of finality, which carried material weight, in particular because the orders were final orders albeit they did not follow a trial on liability (AIC Limited v Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [2022] UKSC 16; [2022] 1 W.L.R. 3223); that there was an established route to challenge judgments on the ground alleged which protected the successful party unless and until a judgment was set-aside; and the circumstances were very different from the few cases where the court had relied upon CPR 3.1(7) (or equivalent provisions in rules governing family proceedings) to set aside final orders.
Mr Rashed is therefore able to continue with his enforcement claim in the Chancery Division.
5RB’s Kate Wilson, instructed by Taylor Hampton, acted for Mr Tamim Rashed.
The judgment is available here.