Mr Cooke’s application for anonymity was refused. C’s application for permission to use documents pursuant to CPR r.31.14 and for its costs to be paid by Mr Cooke were granted.
1. Mr Cooke’s application for anonymity was refused for three primary reasons:
a. The Court rejected the submission that the proper forum for addressing his rights was a claim for misuse of private information in the Media and Communications List. Mr Cooke could advance all the evidence he wanted to in the judicial review proceedings and there was no material difference between the basis on which the Administrative Court had to assess the anonymity application and those on which would be used to assess the issue in a private law privacy claim. 
b. Mr Cooke’s Article 8 ECHR rights were not grounds for granting anonymity. The evidence relied on was insufficient and out of date. It was not causatively linked to the proposed reporting of the proceedings. In all the circumstances it was inadequate to override the strong presumption of open justice which applied equally to disciplinary proceedings of the statutorily regulated professions. Any report of the present proceedings would lose much of its force if neutered by anonymity – applying Yassin v General Medical Council  EWHC 2955 (Admin) and SRA v Spector  4 WLR 16. Moreover, Mr Cooke did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the serious acts of misconduct committed in the context of his professional activities.  – 
c. An anonymity order would serve no practical purpose. There was no restriction on reporting Mr Cooke’s anonymity in respect of the disciplinary proceedings and therefore no purpose in making such an order in the judicial review proceedings. [45(j)].
2. C’s application for permission to use disclosed documents for the purpose of its journalism was granted. It was appropriate to grant such use to allow the judicial review proceedings and police disciplinary proceedings to be reporting in their full and proper context. It was “in the interests of justice that decisions of the tribunal in this case be capable of being reported, together with the respective position of the parties in relation to them.” The absence of the involvement of the IOPC, the stance taken by Hampshire Police and the subsequent anonymization of the Tribunal’s Report and the IOPC’s Press Release absent an anonymity direction all justified media scrutiny and reporting on the case. Mr Cooke’s opposition to the application was grounded on the same basis as his anonymity application which for the same reasons was inadequate to prevent reporting.  – 
3. C’s application for payment of its costs of the claim in full and on the indemnity basis was granted. In this regard the Court concluded that:
a. When it was apparent that no anonymity direction had been made through disclosure, the rest of the claim became otiose, and C had achieved its purpose. 
b. While a costs order against an interested party in judicial review proceedings was unusual, it was justified in this case. Mr Cooke had asserted that he had the benefit of an anonymity direction and had relied on this in his solicitors’ correspondence. He had refused to provide the documents requested by C. C had corresponded appropriately with D and Mr Cooke prior to proceedings. While Mr Cooke said he was under a misapprehension as to the nature of the directions made by D, there was insufficient evidence as to how this misapprehension had arisen and indeed Mr Cooke had at no stage applied for an anonymity order in the disciplinary proceedings. 
c. Mr Cooke’s behaviour was in the circumstances unreasonable which took the case outside of the norm. An order for indemnity costs was therefore appropriate. 
d. It was not appropriate to limit C’s recoverable costs to 25% on the basis that the anonymity direction was one of only four decisions challenged. That approach ignored the issues at the heart of the case. It was artificial to allocate costs by reference simply to the number of decisions challenged .
e. While it was regrettable that D had not disclosed the relevant documents earlier, it was not appropriate for D as a neutral tribunal to descend into the ring, particularly where Mr Cooke was aware of the orders which had been applied for and which had been made. D had complied with his disclosure obligations and in the round had not behaved inappropriately or unreasonably and had not taken an active part in the proceedings. Accordingly, it was not appropriate to make a costs order against D.