(1) C had established jurisdiction.
The Court did have jurisdiction as C could show a ‘good arguable case’ for his claim. Serious harm to his reputation could be inferred: it is not necessary for a libel claimant to identify any publishee who has thought the less of him as a result of the publication; and on the facts the scale of publication was not minimal and has, or was likely in the future, to include publishees who are of importance to C’s reputation. Pleading special damage is not a necessary component of establishing serious harm.
(2) The Court could not grant C an injunction for material online.
C did not have a ‘good arguable case’ to restrain publication of the online article. As D was not domiciled in England, such relief could only be granted if England was the centre of C’s interests, per Bolagsupplysningen OÜ v Svensk Handel AB (C-194/16)  Q.B. 963. C’s evidence of links to England and Wales did not displace his habitual residence, Monaco, as being the centre of his interests.
(3) The Court could grant an injunction for non-internet publications.
This was not a case where C was seeking an interim injunction. Where a libel claimant succeeds at trial, ordinarily a final injunction will be granted. There was a good arguable case that C would be granted an injunction in his libel claim in respect of the non-internet publications if successful.
(4) The claim was not an abuse of process.
The Court of Appeal in Lachaux at  stated that the Jameel principle (where a libel claim may be struck out if it is not a real and substantial tort) overlaps with the test of ‘serious harm’. C had established that he has a good arguable case to satisfy the serious harm test and consequently there has been a serious tort committed against him.