Bridgen v Hancock [2026] EWCA Civ 991

Mr Bridgen, a former Conservative MP, posted a tweet (“the Bridgen Tweet”), comprising (a) a link to an article by Dr Joshua Guetzkow, an academic (“the Guetzkow Article”), about adverse events reported by people who had received Covid vaccinations; (b) a snapshot of part of the Guetzkow Article; and (c) this observation:

“As one consultant cardiologist said to me this is the biggest crime against humanity since the Holocaust.”

Mr Hancock, the former Health Secretary, responded to the Bridgen Tweet by asking a question in the House of Commons at Prime Minister’s Questions (“PMQs”). Half an hour later, Mr Hancock posted a Tweet (“the Hancock Tweet”) comprising an embedded video of the exchange at PMQs and a statement in which, without naming Mr Bridgen, he denounced the Bridgen Tweet, writing as follows:

“The disgusting and dangerous anti-semitic, anti-vax, anti-scientific conspiracy theories spouted by a sitting MP this morning are unacceptable and have absolutely no place in our society.”

Mr Bridgen sued for libel in respect of the term antisemitic.

Mr Hancock sought summary judgment on the issue of whether an honest person could have held that opinion (s3(4) Defamation Act 2013) and summary judgment on, or strike out of, Mr Bridgen’s case that he did not hold that opinion (s3(5) Defamation Act 2013). Mr Hancock appealed against the decision of Collins Rice J (“the Judge”) that the merits of his defence were not clear and needed to be tested at a trial.

1. Whether the Judge was wrong to refuse the Defendant’s application for summary judgment on the issue raised by s3(4) (“the Objective Honesty Condition”).
2. Whether the Judge was wrong to refuse summary judgment on the issue raised by s3(5) or alternatively to strike out the parts of the Reply addressing s3(5) (“the Dishonesty Qualification”) because:
   1. The Judge was wrong to consider that a case under s3(5) can be founded on the objective unreasonableness of the opinion expressed;
   2. The Judge failed to apply the heightened standard that applies to a plea of this kind and that had she done so she would have been bound to conclude that the Claimant’s case did not meet that standard; and/or
   3. The Judge was wrong to regard the Defendant as bearing an evidential burden to explain his own state of mind when he had no case to answer.

The Court of Appeal (Warby LJ, with whom Whipple and King LJJ agreed) allowed the Defendant’s appeal, struck out the Claimant’s Reply, and entered summary judgment for the Defendant.

The Objective Honesty Condition – s3(4) Defamation Act 2013

The Court set aside the judgment below and remade the decision in favour of Mr Hancock [62]-[64] for the following reasons.

First, the Court addressed the four reasons given by the Judge for refusing to enter summary judgment in favour of the Defendant, which were criticised by the Defendant:

• “It may be important to review the responses of other commentators”.

The Appellant’s case succeeded on this point, as he was not and is not running an evidential case on this matter. Warby LJ went further, noting that when determining whether an honest person could hold the opinion expressed by the defendant the views expressed by others about the same matters are not admissible, as it is unsupported by authority, and a matter of principle and pragmatism [38]-[47].

2) “There needs to be fuller evidential exploration of the limits of what views can be held”.

There was no need for fuller evidential exploration of the limits of what views can be held, as the outer limits of the opinions an honest person could hold on a given factual basis are to be identified by the court objectively, as a matter of judgment, based on argument [48]-[49].

3) “There needs to be fuller argument”.

The Judge’s decision to reserve the issue for trial, even if the court would not be assisted by further evidence, was not a sufficient reason for declining to form a concluded judgment on this issue, reiterating the benefits of summary determination of defamation claims [50].

4) “There is an overlap with a triable issue under s 3(5)”.

A defendant’s purposes cannot play a part in deciding the objective question of whether an honest person could hold the opinion which the defendant expressed. The Court also rejected the Judge’s conclusion that there is a triable issue under s3(5) [51].

Second, the Court addressed four additional/alternative reasons for reaching the same conclusions advanced by the Claimant:

5) “Mr Hancock is not entitled to rely on facts about the Holocaust or the pandemic”.

The Bridgen Tweet, identified as the basis for the opinion, refers to the Holocaust, the pandemic and the vaccine rollout. Facts about the Holocaust or the pandemic are plainly relevant and admissible as facts which an honest person could take into account in forming the opinion [52]-[54].

6) “Authoritative definitions of antisemitism show, or may show, that the opinion is untenable”.

The Judge was correct not to refer to the definition of antisemitism, and the boundaries of the opinions which an honest person can hold on the basis of given facts are generally to be identified by the court, not by the opinions of others [55]-[56].

7) “The presumption of falsity is a reason the case should go to trial”.

The Claimant reiterated arguments on the common law presumption of falsity, rejected by the Judge. The Judge was correct to reject these, as this has no relevance in a case about a defamatory statement of opinion [57]-[58].

8) “Mr Bridgen’s use of the word ‘since’ is or may be fatal to the defence”.

The Claimant argued that the inclusion of the word “since”, when describing the vaccine rollout as “the biggest crime against humanity since the Holocaust”, meant that it was not even arguably antisemitic, as it inherently recognised the seriousness of the Holocaust. The Court rejected this argument, noting that this comment expressly suggested some form of comparability and that the vaccine programme was a crime against humanity worse than any other in the intervening 75 years. The Appellant identified a possible thought process that an honest person could think that by comparing the two events – mentioning them in the same breath – Mr Bridgen was minimising or trivialising the Holocaust, and that this was not only deeply offensive to Jewish people but also antisemitic. The Court did not accept that reasoning of that kind can be dismissed as impossible for any honest person, nor did they accept that a trial is necessary to determine whether this is a line of thinking in which an honest person could engage [59]-[61].

The Dishonesty Qualification (s3(5))

The Court held that the Judge erred in law, the Reply should be struck out, and summary judgment entered for Mr Hancock, after addressing four main issues:

• Is objective unreasonableness relevant?

The Judge was wrong to conclude that a case under s3(5) can be founded upon the objective unreasonableness of the opinion [77]-[78].

• Did the Judge apply the heightened standard?

The Judge applied a considerably lower standard than required in this case [79].

• Does Mr Bridgen’s case meet the heightened standard?

The Claimant’s case disclosed no reasonable basis and had no real prospect of success of meeting this standard [80]-[87].

• What of the absence of evidence from Mr Hancock?

The Defendant’s solicitor had briefly addressed this point, however in the absence of a sufficiently cogent case to answer, Mr Hancock came under no burden to explain himself [88].

The Judgment provides helpful clarification on s3(4) and s3(5) of the Defamation Act 2013. There are five notable aspects of this Judgment.

First, the Judgment reiterates the scope of the honest opinion defence, addressing the “Objective Honesty Condition” (s3(4)). Warby LJ charts the evolution of the common law “fair comment” defence to the s3 defence of “honest opinion”, noting that the objective standard of honesty is substantially lower than requiring that the opinion be justified, or a fair or reasonable opinion to hold on the basis of the facts. Warby LJ outlined authorities which clearly state how even “… the crank, the enthusiast, may say what he honestly thinks as much as the reasonable man or woman who sits on a jury”: Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743, 747 (Diplock LJ).

Second, the Judgment provides clarity on the role of evidence when determining whether an honest person could hold the opinion expressed by the defendant by reference to the views expressed by others about the same matters. Warby LJ held that evidence of this nature is not admissible for reasons of both principle and pragmatism [41]-[46].

Third, in relation to the Dishonesty Qualification (s3(5)), the Judgment demonstrates the importance of applying the heightened standard when pleading and proving malice [68].

Fourth, the Judgment addresses whether the objective unreasonableness of an opinion could be relied on for the purposes of s3(5). In the absence of authority on the matter, Warby LJ approached this from first principles, noting that the objective unreasonableness of an opinion could never be enough of itself to show a probability that the defendant did not hold the opinion. S3(5) will only be considered once the Objective Honesty Condition (s3(4)) is met, and it would be incoherent to find that this test was satisfied and go on to find that the opinion was so unreasonable that by inference the defendant probably did not hold it [77]-[78].

Fifth, the Judgment reiterates that a statement of opinion cannot be shown to be false or “wrong”, the test is whether the defendant held a genuine belief in the opinion expressed [82].