Warby LJ (Vos MR and Sharp P agreeing):
(1) No. The Judge’s decision was an “unobjectionable application of accepted principles to the undisputed facts of the case”. As the decision was a finding of fact, absent legal error the CA would only interfere if it was satisfied the finding was wrong. To the contrary, Warby LJ agreed with the Judge that D was giving his explanation as to why he had said that the Zionists in the meeting did not understand English irony. To do so, he was “explaining, from his standpoint, what had happened”; “telling the story”; and “presenting viewers with a factual narrative”.
(2) No. The CA rejected D’s submission that the Judge’s use of the term ‘bare comment’ showed that he must have concluded that D’s words were a statement of opinion, but one that he must treat as a statement of fact, and had therefore wrongly conflated the first two stages of the statutory analysis (ss 3(2) and (3) of the 2013 Act).
The Judge’s clear and unequivocal finding was that the terms ‘disruptive’ and ‘abusive’ were allegations of fact. The remainder of  set out an alternative basis for the decision by recording D’s submission that the statement was “merely expressing a view”, and rejecting it on the basis that even if the statement was an opinion, it was a bare comment.
In any case, D’s criticism of the Judge was ill-founded in law and in fact:
(a) The Judge was correct to treat the concept of bare comment as an aspect of the first condition (in section 3(2) of the 2013 Act). Joseph v Spiller  UKSC 53 did not affect the right approach to the first condition, as it was a decision about the second condition now contained in s3(3).
(b) There is no rule that requires a court to artificially treat a statement of opinion as if it was a statement of fact. The question is simply: “would the words used strike the ordinary viewer as a statement of fact or opinion?” Cases on bare comment do not lay down a rigid rule of law that requires a Court to depart from this key principle.
(3) No. This was also finding on a question of fact, and the Judge made no error of law. To the contrary, Warby LJ found that the Judge was correct. In particular:
(a) The judge did not err in finding that the behaviour of which C was accused was of such a level of seriousness “as to involve the police in potentially ejecting Mr. Millett and the other individual (suggesting criminal misconduct)”. The bracketed reference to “suggesting criminal misconduct” did not impermissibly add to the meaning the Judge had identified.
(b) Right-thinking viewers would not regard the conduct attributed to C as an acceptable exercise of free speech. D did not downplay what had happened but emphasised its seriousness, for example stating that the police wanted to throw D out of the meeting.
(c) The Judge was not wrong to deal separately with the consensus requirement (that the statement “tends to lower C in the estimation of right-thinking people generally”) and the threshold of seriousness (that the imputation must have a “substantially adverse effect” on the way that people would treat C). These are separate but complementary components of the common law test.
However, there was some merit in D’s criticism of the Judge’s multi-factorial approach to the common law threshold of seriousness (which for example, took into account circumstantial matters such as the programme’s influence). These matters are generally left out of account at this stage, but may be relevant to the statutory requirement of serious harm. Nevertheless, the Judge’s overarching conclusion that the words complained of crosses the common law threshold of seriousness could not be faulted.