On 21 July 2026, Griffiths J found Dr Sean Stimson (the defendant) in contempt of court for breaches of undertakings which he had given to the court to settle a harassment claim brought by Foot Anstey LLP and Foot Anstey Trust Corporation Limited pursuant to s1(1A) and s3A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997: [2026] EWHC 1847 (KB).
The claimants were instructed by charities who were the beneficiaries of the will of the defendant’s late aunt. He disputed that will. The defendant’s conduct towards the claimants’ staff and others led them to bring proceedings for harassment to obtain an injunction. That claim was settled, by the defendant giving undertakings to the court which included undertakings governing and limiting the nature of his correspondence with the claimants, including prohibiting him from sending threatening and abusive communications.
Despite the defendant disputing the will, a Grant of Representation was made in favour of Foot Anstey.
Subsequently, the defendant sent an email and a letter (which he denied sending) to Foot Anstey which contained threats and abuse. Foot Anstey brought an application for his committal for contempt. The defendant argued that the terms of his email should not be construed as making any threat, or at least were capable of conveying a meaning which was not a threat of physical violence and that, therefore, the court could not be satisfied to the criminal standard that the email was a breach of his undertakings ([14]). In respect to the second count, he denied having anything to do with the letter received by Foot Anstey ([15]). He further argued that the second count should be dismissed as an abuse of process because the claimants (it was argued) had analogous duties to criminal prosecutors and had not, it was contended, followed lines of enquiry which such prosecutors would have been obliged to do on the same facts, and the application breached his Art 6 rights.
At the start of the hearing, the defendant filed written evidence (which was admitted) and also elected to give evidence at the hearing.
In respect of the first count (the email), Griffiths J was satisfied that it contained a direct threat prohibited by the undertakings ([76-78]) (but did not breach the other undertakings). In respect of the second count (the letter), he was satisfied to the criminal standard that the defendant was responsible for it. The judge gave detailed reasons having regard to: the letter’s contents, which concerned matters which had been persistent features of the defendant’s earlier emails to Foot Anstey; the fact it was a typed document; the handwriting on the envelope; the postmark; and the location of posting ([57]). He found that the defendant was not a credible witness ([58]). The judge dismissed the submission that the letter could have been sent by someone else ([65]). The judge rejected the argument that all the evidence was circumstantial, but even if it were to be treated as such, he was satisfied that ‘a reasonable mind can only conclude’ that the defendant was responsible for sending the letter ([69]).
Griffiths J rejected the abuse of process application. Of most interest is his rejection of the argument that a claimant on a contempt application is required to advance the application as a criminal prosecutor is expected to conduct criminal proceedings ([86-90]).
A separate hearing has been listed to consider any penalties.
Kate Wilson, instructed by Foot Anstey LLP, acted for the claimants on the contempt application.
John Stables acted for the claimants in the original harassment proceedings, including an interim injunction application: [2024] EWHC 2621 (KB).
The judgment is available here.
