Ideasoft v Kolomiets [2026] EWHC 1775 (KB)

The First and Third Claimants are software development companies registered in Ukraine and Estonia respectively. The Second Claimant, a Ukrainian national and resident in Portugal was the Chief Executive Officer of the First and Third Claimants, and director of the latter. The Defendant is the former Chief Business Development Officer of the First Claimant. He is an Israeli citizen, and he is and was at all material times resident in England. After the Defendant stood down from his role in November 2022, he and the First Claimant entered into exit agreements which included an agreement that he would sell his shareholding back to the company in January 2023 [7]-[10].

The Claimants’ pleaded harassment case is that the Defendant sent a series of emails to the Second Claimant, members of the Senior Management Team and employees of a then majority shareholder of the First Claimant, as part of a campaign of blackmail and harassment targeted at the First Claimant’s employees and the Second Claimant [11].

The Defendant sought to strike out or be granted “reverse” summary judgment in relation to, the entirety of the harassment claim and the defamation claims of the First Claimant in relation to an email sent to the Vice President and Head of Research and Development at Browzwear Solutions PTE Limited, a Singaporean company based in Israel, and Stylezone Limited, an Israeli company which formed part of the Browzwear group of companies, (“Warning Email”) and social media post published to the Defendant’s LinkedIn account (“Social Media Post”).

The Defendant sought to strike out or be granted “reverse” summary judgment in relation to:

1. The whole of the harassment claim brought by the First and Second Claimants, on the basis that:
   1. the harassment alleged by them is not said by the Claimants to have affected, and does not affect, any relevant person in England and Wales, on the basis of the statutory presumption against extra-territorial effect of criminal statutes; or alternatively
   2. the pleaded case and/or the evidence fall short of a course of conduct of sufficient seriousness to give rise to reasonable grounds for bringing the harassment claim, or a real prospect of the claim succeeding.

2. The defamation claim based on the Warning Email brought by the First Claimant (though not the claim brought by the Second and Third Claimants based on the same email), on the basis that the First Claimant has not pleaded reasonable grounds for asserting, and has no real prospect of establishing, that it:
   1. Has a trading reputation in England and Wales; and/or
   2. Has suffered or is likely to suffer “serious financial loss” for the purposes of section 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013.

3. The defamation claim brought by the First Claimant based on the Social Media Post on the same bases as apply to the Defendant’s application in respect of the Warning Email.

The Defendant’s strike out application was refused for the following reasons:

Harassment

1. The Particulars of Claim disclosed reasonable grounds for bringing the claim in harassment and was not abusive under CPR r.3.4(2), and the harassment claim has a real prospect of success [54]-[58].
2. Linden J concluded that he should not determine the issue of territoriality, or strike out the claim in harassment, but rather that this claim should go to trial and the territorial effect issue be determined on the facts as found by the trial judge. Linden J recognised the real prospect of establishing that the authorities relied on were decided on an incorrect legal basis, noting that he was not obliged to give summary judgment, and may only do so if “there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at trial” (CPR r.24.3(b)) [82]-[93].

Defamation

3. Although the First Claimant had not pleaded its trading reputation in England and Wales for the purposes of its claim based on the Social Media Post, they had sufficient evidence to suggest that it did have a trading reputation within the jurisdiction, and as such there was no basis on which to go behind their evidence in the context of an application for summary disposal. The First Claimant was directed to amend its Particulars of Claim to plead its case on double actionability and trading reputations in this jurisdiction [94]-[105].
4. In relation to the Warning Email, Linden J refused to strike out the First Claimant’s case but directed that they amend the Particulars of Claim to plead details of serious financial loss [118]-[123]. In relation to the Social Media Post, Linden J accepted that the Particulars of Claim, supplemented by the evidence of the Second Claimant and Ms Datsenko, did establish a case with a real prospect of success in relation to serious financial loss [124]-[126].

There are two notable aspects of this Judgment.

First, its analysis of the territorial effect of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

The Defendant outlined a line of first-instance authority, including Shakil-Ur-Rahman v ARY Network Ltd [2016] EWHC 3110 (QB), [2018] 4 WLR 22, Lawal v Adeyinka and Coker [2021] EWHC 2486 (QB), Bukhari v Bukhari [2025] EWHC 2391 (KB), and Rzucek v Vinnicombe [2026] EWHC 946 (KB), which they argued were fatal to a harassment claim of this nature, where those alleged to have been harassed by the Defendant were outside the jurisdiction [59]-[65].

The Claimants argued that these judgments were per incuriam, because they failed to take into account authorities on the approach to territorial effect in the criminal law, and wrong because (a) it is not necessary for harassment to be experienced by the alleged victim for breach of the 1997 Act to be established: all that is needed is that a course of conduct which, on an objective assessment, is of the nature described by the Act following Majrowski v Guy’s & St Thomas Hospital [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224; and (b), even if this is wrong, it does not follow from the fact that the course of conduct is experienced abroad by the claimant that the 1997 Act does not “bite”. The Claimants detailed authorities within the criminal context, including R v Treacy [1971] AC 537 in which the House of Lords held that the offence of blackmail was committed in England in a case where the unlawful demand was posted from England to Germany [66]-[81].

Linden J noted that the questions this case raises about extra-territoriality and harassment may require an appeal to the Court of Appeal, recognising the value of this matter going to the Court of Appeal once facts are established [87], [93].

Second, the Judgment provides a helpful summary of the authorities on the requirements of pleading extra-territorial libel claims. The Judgment applies Ogunkami v Chia [2026] EWCA Civ 588, handed down the day after the hearing, in which Warby LJ set out the legal and procedural consequences of the double actionability rule at [32], which materially affected the First Claimant’s libel claim based on the Social Media Post. Linden J recognised that the evidence before the court suggested that the First Claimant could plead a case which, at least, has a real prospect of success on the issue of their trading reputation in England and Wales.