Kaur v Fox [2026] EWHC 1743 (KB)

This was a trial of preliminary issues in relation to the libel claim as ordered by Steyn J on 4 December 2025 and the hearing of 1) the Claimant’s application for delivery up and 2) the Defendant’s application to strike out the Claimant’s claims for misuse of private information and breach of the data protection legislation. The Defendant agreed to adjourn the latter application pending receipt of the draft amended Particulars of Claim.

The Claimant issued proceedings for libel, misuse of private information, data protection breaches and harassment. The Claimant pleaded 40 tweets in the harassment claim, 18 of which were said to independently found claims in libel.

1. The natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of;
2. Whether any of the meanings so determined is defamatory of the Claimant at common law;
3. Whether, and the extent to which, each meaning so determined is or contains statements of fact or opinion under s.3(2) of the Defamation Act 2013;

Whether any statements of opinion indicate in general or specific terms the basis of the opinion for the purposes of s.3(3) of the 2013 Act.

The Judge dismissed 8 of the 18 libel claims, for the following reasons:

• Publications D, K and O did not satisfy the consensus requirement or cross the threshold of seriousness and as such were not defamatory at common law [83], [120], [133].
• Publication H did not refer to the Claimant, and even if the Defendant had named the Claimant, it would not cross the seriousness threshold required to be defamatory at common law [104]-[105].
• Publication L did not refer to the Claimant, and even if it had named her, would simply be vulgar abuse in the context of the Defendant’s general criticisms of the country, and not defamatory at common law [123].
• Publications M, N did not refer to the Claimant, and in the absence of a pleaded case as to what the hypothetical reader would have known about the Claimant, the Judge did not express a view about whether a meaning which named the Claimant would have been defamatory at common law [126]-[127], [129].
• Publication R did not contain the words complained of and was not pursued [149].

The 10 remaining publications were held to be defamatory at common law.

In relation to the Claimant’s application for delivery up, the Judge noted that although the Claimant sought the application “as a matter of urgency” the application was only made after the Defendant made his strike out application [150]-[157]. The Judge refused the Claimant’s application for delivery up, noting that: the cause of action to support the proposed order was not specified; it would not be fair to make such an order without the Defendant being given the fair opportunity to argue; there did not appear to be a present or imminent threat of publication; and it would not be just and convenient for the purposes of s.37 Senior Courts Act 1981 [164]-[170].

The Judge held that s.3(3) was satisfied in the case of each of the statements of opinion which the Judge found to be defamatory [54].

The hearing involved interesting discussions of the social consensus, or absence of social consensus on sexual mores. This arose in the context of the Claimant’s previous operation of an OnlyFans account, referred to in a number of the Defendant’s tweets. The Defendant’s submissions outlined the evolving social mores, namely noting that the repeal of the Slander of Woman Act 1891, by s.14 of the Defamation Act 2013 demonstrated the absence of a social consensus in relation to allegations of unchastity of women, and in taking this step, Parliament accepted that the view that such allegations are slanderous per se is based on antiquated moral views [37]-[41].

Apart from Publications F and G, the publications which were held to be defamatory at common law focussed of hypocrisy, rather than the social consensus on sexual morality.

The Judgment reiterates the importance of establishing reference, or pleading a reference innuendo, in libel claims, as 4 of the 18 claims failed on the basis that they did not refer to the Claimant.